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it being improbable that such an exchange would be resorted to in such a
transaction. But in a private transfer,.where the possibility of fraud and
adverse interest of the agent is greatly increased, a duty to inquire might
more reasonably be imposed. It is unlikely, however, that most courts would
demand inquiry on account of similarity of surnames alone, as this would
necessitate added expense, delay, and trouble for the corporation. Where
awareness of a marital relation is present, positive knowledge of suspicious
factors in the transaction actually exists. Consequently, inquiry may reason-
ably be demanded, or the corporation charged with the consequences of its
omission.
W.N.
TORTS--PARnNT AND CHLD---LiABILiTY OF PARENT TO CILD FOR PER-
SONAL INJURY-[Missouri].-In an action by a minor adopted child against
its foster parent for personal injuries wilfully and maliciously inflicted, the
Kansas City Court of Appeals denied liability on the ground that a minor
child cannot sue its parent for personal injuries.' The court repudiated
dicta to the opposite effect in Dix v. Martin,2 which indicated that the child
could recover for injuries caused by wicked and excessive punishment.
This decision is supported by the great weight of authority in other
jurisdictions.3 Civil liability of the parent to the child, 4 or child to parent,'
for personal injuries negligently or intentionally 7 inflicted is refused on
the ground of public policy. The courts seek to discourage any acts which
might break the domestic tranquillity$ and to give the parent the right to
discipline the child free from fear of civil liability." Furthermore, criminal
liability is regarded as a sufficient restraint to protect the child.10 Civil
immunity is granted anyone who stands in loco parentis to the child.21
The existence of this relation depends upon whether the parties intended
to assume its obligations and is usually a question of fact for the jury.2
Nebraska, the only state which refuses to follow the broad majority rule,
holds that a parent may be liable for injuries caused by punishment that
1. Cook v. Cook (Mo. App. 1939) 124 S. W. (2d) 675.
2. (1913) 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S. W. 133, 136.
3. Note (1923) 31 A. L. R. 1157; Note (1925) 42 A. L. R. 1363.
4. Ibid.
5. Duffy v. Duffy (1935) 117 Pa. Super. 500, 178 Atl. 165; Schneider v.
Schneider (1930) 160 Md. 18, 152 At. 498, 72 A. L. R. 449.
6. Matarese v. Materese (1925) 47 R. I. 131, 131 Atl. 198, 42 A. L. R.
1360.
7. Roller v. Roller (1905) 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788.
8. Wick v. Wick (1927) 192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787; Small v. Morrison
(1923) 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12, 31 A. L. R. 1135; Roller v. Roller
(1905) 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788.
9. Matarese v. Matarese (1925) 47 R. I. 131, 131 At. 198, 42 A. IL. R.
1360; Wick v. Wick (1927) 192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787.
10. Hewelette v. George (1891) 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 13 L. R. A. 682.
11. Fortinberry v. Holmes (1907) 89 Miss. 373, 42 So. 799.
12. Capek v. Kropik (1889) 129 Ill. 509,21 N. E. 836; Martens v. Martens
(1933) 11 N. J. Misc. 705, 167 At. 227.
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is immoderate and unreasonable.s This was thought, on the basis of Dix v.
Martin, to be the Missouri rule.'4 Indiana formerly held 5 that, where the
injuries were inflicted malo animo and the acts were abhorrent to the
family relation, an action would lie. It has repudiated this view.16 In
Wells v. Wells,17 the same court that decided Dix V. Martin and the instant
case allowed a parent to recover against a minor child declaring the public
policy of the state to be settled by Dix v. Martin. The instant case appears
inconsistent with that decision.
Legal writers have expressed the opinion that the broad general rule
should be limited in its application to instances in which the reasons on
which it is based apply. It has been suggested that the parent be granted
a qualified privilege in respect to parental discipline and control and to the
conduct of the domestic establishment.'s He would be liable, not for mere
errors of judgment, but for injuries caused by acts manifestly outside the
parental relation or in excess of his authority. Thus the child would be
allowed to recover damages where it is admitted, by the criminal law at
least, that he was wronged.
W. B. W.
TRADE REGULATION-ROBINSoN-PATMAN AcT-BROMERAGE FuEs--[Fed-
eral].-A purchasing agency furnished marketing information and other
purchasing services to over 300 subscribing wholesalers for a monthly
stipend. The agency also made purchases for its subscribers at their request,
passing on to them the brokerage commissions collected from sellers."
Brokerage commissions thus received by 86 per cent of the subscribers
amounted to less than the amount paid by them for the services under the
contract with the purchasing agency. The facilities of the agency enabled
sellers to find buyers without employing brokers to reach these customers.
The Federal Trade Commission issued an order 2 to the subscribing buyers,
the purchasing agency, and the sellers to desist from payment or receipt
of brokerage fees in violation of Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act.3
13. Clasen v. Pruhs (1903) 69 Neb. 278, 95 N. W. 640, 5 Ann. Cas. 112.
14. Note (1923) 31 A. L. R. 1157, 1161.
15. Treschman v. Treschman (1901) 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E. 961, 963.
16. Smith v. Smith (1924) 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N. E. 128.
17. (1932) 48 S. W. (2d) 109.
18. Reeves, Domestic Relations (4th ed. 1888) 357; McCurdy, Torts Be-
tween Persons in Domestic Relations (1930) 43 Harv. L. R. 1030, 1079.
1. Buyers sometimes named the seller from whom they preferred to
purchase, sometimes not. Sellers shipped and billed orders directly to
buyers, and buyers paid directly to sellers, who sent commissions to the
purchasing agent.
2. (1937) 106 C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv. par. 9058.
3. "* * * it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive compensation, or any
allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in con-
nection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, either to
the other party to such transaction or to an agent, representative, or other
intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in be-
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